农村环境治理的现实困境与机制创新——基于委托代理的博弈分析

Study on Practical Dilemma and Mechanism Innovation of Rural Environment Governance: Using Game Analysis Based on Principal Agent

【目的】分析比较农村环境治理中不同主体的监督效率及其对农户环境治理意愿的影响。【方法】基于委托-代理理论构建了一个农村环保项目实施中的道德风险模型。【结果】由于农村环境的公共品性质和监督上的困难,原子化的农户常采取搭便车行为,使农村环保陷入"囚徒困境";内生于乡土社会的农民合作组织利用成员间的重复博弈和"熟人社会"形成的监督优势,可以提高农户的环保投入能力,激励农户的环境治理意愿;通过互联合同把环境治理行为内嵌在新型农业产业化组织中,利用不同合作领域的监督,可以进一步增强农户的环境治理意愿。【结论】未来的机制创新必须在尊重农户主体地位的基础上,充分发挥各种类型农民合作组织在环境治理上的优势。

[Objective] This study compares the monitoring efficiency among different governing subjects and analyses its effect on farmers environment protection intentions. [Method] Based on principal-agent theory, it constructs the model of moral hazard in the implementation phase of ru- ral environment protection project. [Results] The results indicate that because of the public own- ership property of rural environment and difficulties in monitoring, scattered peasants often take some measures to free ride eventually leads rural environment protection into so called ＂prisoner dilemma＂. Mutual supervision which will reduce the monitoring cost among the farmer coopera- tive organization can be used to improve peasants＂ willingness-to-pay and ability-to-pay for the en- vironment protection. We can embed environment protection behaviour into agricultural industri- alization organization by means of interrelated contracts, and making use of monitoring in differ- ent cooperative spheres, in order to make further improvement. [Conclusion] The future reform model should give full play to the monitoring advantage of different type of farmer cooperative or- ganizations.