法律救济的规则选择：财产规则、责任规则与卡梅框架的法律经济学重构

Classifying Rules and Comparing Efficiency of Legal Remedies:Restructuring Property Rules, Liability Rules and Cameron Framework from a Legal and Economic Perspective

法律经济学上的"卡-梅框架",是从法益保护的效果模式出发,对法律规则做出的一个类型划分。其原初结构是以法益的转移自由和定价意愿为标准划分的"财产规则"、"责任规则"和"禁易规则"。通过引入法益的初始归属和限价方式两个新的划分标准,可以增添"管制规则"和"无为规则"两个新的类型,扩展和重构"卡-梅框架"的救济分类和规则结构。这五类规则构成了法律经济学上可供选择的一个"规则菜单"。一个社会在特定领域的规则选择,对应着国家权力干涉社会生活的不同程度,体现了法律背后的观念变化和权力博弈。对于法律救济规则分类与效率比较的理论研究,有助于深化对中国现行法律的学术理解和制度完善。

The ＂Cameron Framework＂ in Economics of Law refers to classifying the types of legal rules from the effect pattern of protecting legal interests. The original structure of the Cameron Framework is ＂prop- erty rules＂, liability rules＂ and ＂forbidden rules＂ which are classified based on a standard of free transfer of legal interests and pricing willingness. Two new types of ＂regulation rules＂ and ＂doing nothing rules＂ can be added and remedy classification and rule structure of the ＂Cameron Framework＂ can be expanded and restrue- tured through introducing two new classification standards of the original attribution and limited price form. These five types of rules constitute an optional ＂rule menu＂ in Economics of Law. The comparison of the effi- ciency of selecting the rules is related to two types of standards of ex ante efficiency and ex post efficiency. The economic effect of different rules is finally reflected in market pricing of legal interests and is corresponding with different types of markets. The choice of rules for a society in the specified field, which is corresponding with various degrees of the state power interfering social life, embodies the change of idea and the game of power behind law. Theoretical research on classifying rules and comparing efficiency of the legal remedies is beneficial for academic understanding and system improvement of the existing laws in China.