最优农业契约与中国农业产业化模式被引量：89

The Optimal Agricultural Contracts and the Models of Agricultural Industrialization in China

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摘要本文在一个统一的关系契约分析框架下,比较了单期和多期条件下"农户+市场"、"龙头企业+农户"和"龙头企业+农场"三种主要的农业产业化模式及其衍生模式的生产效率,并分析了产权、声誉、抵押和风险态度对最优农业契约的影响。我们的分析表明,在单期条件下,由于契约不完全和敲竹杠效应,所有模式都无法实现最优效率;在多期条件下,如果贴现率足够低,"龙头企业+农户"和"龙头企业+农场"这两种模式都可以实现最优效率;如果市场价格波动比较大,则"龙头企业+农场"模式优于"龙头企业+农户"模式。我们还分析了农户的转售成本对契约效率的影响,并提供了支持本文结论的典型案例。 Within a unified framework of relational contracts, this article compares the allocation efficiency of three industrialization models （＂farmers in market＂, ＂leading firms plus farmers＂, and ＂leading firms plus farms＂） and their derivatives under one or multiple pe- riods. It also analyzes the effects of ownership, reputation, pledge, and risk attitude on opti- mal agricultural contracts. It is shown that under one-period contracts all the models cannot achieve the first-best efficiency due to contractual completeness and hold-up effect. Under re- lational contracts both ＂leading firm plus farmer＂ and ＂leading firm plus farm＂ models can achieve the first-best efficiency if the discount factor is high enough. ＂Leading firms plus farms＂ is better than ＂leading firms plus farmers＂ if the market prices are highly fluctuating. This article also discusses the influence of farmers＇ resale costs on contractual efficiency.

作者聂辉华

机构地区中国人民大学经济学院中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心

出处《经济学（季刊）》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第4期313-330,共18页 China Economic Quarterly

基金教育部"全国优秀博士学位论文作者专项资助"课题(No.200903) 姚洋教授主持的国家社科基金重大项目"我国中长期经济增长与结构变动趋势研究(09&ZD020)"的资助

关键词农业契约农业产业化不完全契约关系契约产权

分类号 F320 [经济管理—产业经济]

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