融资约束、控制权私利与金字塔结构

Financial Constraint,Private Benefits of Control and Pyramidal Structure

在投资者理性框架下,构建了终极控制人对公司控制权结构选择的决策模型。模型结果表明,公司控制权结构选择是状态依存的(依具体参数而定),融资约束越严重的公司越可能被终极控制人利用金字塔结构控制。终极控制人利用平行结构控制新建公司时,已建公司其他股东可能受益也可能受损;而终极控制人利用金字塔结构控制新建公司时,已建公司其他股东必定受益。

Under the assumption of rational investors, the paper constructs the decision model about the corporate controlling structure choice by the ultimate controlling shareholders. The model results show that the structure of corporate control is a state-dependent selection （depending on the specific parameters）, and the more severe the company＇s financial constraint, the more likely it will be controlled by the uhiroate controlling shareholders with pyramidal structure. The other shareholders of the old corporate may be benefitted or suffer losses when the ultimate controlling shareholders control the new company with Horizontal structure, whereas they may be sure to be benefited when the ultimate controlling shareholders control the new company with pyramidal structure.