期刊文献+

国际海洋资源环境管理困境与破解——基于集体行动理论的视角 被引量:3

On the Dilemma of Environmental Governance of International Marine Resources and Its Counter-measures——Viewed from the Theory of Collective Action
下载PDF
导出
摘要 加强国际海洋资源环境管理已成为世界各国21世纪发展海洋经济、促进经济社会可持续发展的关键举措。人类活动已致使海洋渔业资源濒临枯竭、海洋环境遭受重大破坏,国际海洋渔业资源捕捞面临"公地悲剧"、国际海洋环境容量过度使用陷入"囚徒困境"、国际海洋资源环境管理遭遇"集体行动悖论"。为了有效破解这一集体行动困境,国际社会应加强区域合作、构建区域合作机制;强化"选择性诱因"激励机制;积极培育利益共同体成员间的社会资本;改革联合国海洋资源环境管理机构、强化机构间协调。 Strengthening of the international marine resources environment has become the key concern to the in- ternational community throughout the 21 century to develop marine economy, and for the economic society to promote sustainable development. Indiscriminable fishing has caused marine fishery resources to border on being exhausted, and marine environment has been polluted extremely. Development and utilization of the marine fishery resource faces a "tragedy of the commons", over utilization of the marine environmental capacity results in "prisoner' s dilemma", governance of the marine resources and environment experiences "paradox of collec- tive action". In order to solve the dilemma, the international community has to do the followings: strengthening regional cooperation, constructing regional cooperation mechanism; perfecting selective inducement; actively cultivating social capitals among community of interests ; reforming the departments of governance of internation- al marine resource and environment in the UN, and strengthening the inter- agency coordination.
作者 李建勋
机构地区 黄冈师范学院
出处 《太平洋学报》 CSSCI 2012年第11期89-97,共9页 Pacific Journal
基金 国家社会科学基金重点项目"加快推进生态文明建设的法律问题研究"(10A2D008) 黄冈师范学院博士基金项目"区域海洋规划环境保护法研究"(09CD152)的阶段性成果
关键词 国际海洋资源环境 管理困境 集体行动理论 international marine resource and environment governance dilemma theory of collective action
  • 相关文献

参考文献29

  • 1House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee,2007. The UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment : First Report of Session 2006-07.
  • 2Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons" , Science,1968,162,pp. 1243 -1248.
  • 3Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard Univer-sity Press, 1965.
  • 4冯巨章.西方集体行动理论的演化与进展[J].财经问题研究,2006(8):24-29. 被引量:22
  • 5Edel,Matthew, "A Note on Collection Action, Marxism, andThe Prisoners ' Dilemma",Journal of Economic Issues,1979 ,13(3),pp. 751 -761.
  • 6North, Douglass C. , Structure and Change in Economic Histo-ry ,W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.,1981.
  • 7Runge,Carlisle F.," Institutions and the Free Rider The As-surance Problem in Collective Action, Journal of Politics, 1984,46 ,pp. 154-181.
  • 8[美]罗伯特 D.帕特南著,王列、赖海榕译.《使民主运转起来》,江西人民出版社,2001年版,第200页.
  • 9Chong D. , Collective Action and The Civil Rights Movement,Chicago University Press, 1991.
  • 10Ostrom,Elinor.," A Behavioral Approach to the RationalChoice Theory of Collective Action" ,American Political Science Review,1998' 92,pp. 1 -22.

二级参考文献28

  • 1Esteban,J.,and D.Ray.Collection Action and The Group Size Paradox[J].The American Political Science Review,2001,95,3:663-672.
  • 2Oliver,Pamela E.,and G.Marwell.The Paradox of Group Size in Collection Action:A Theory of The Critical Mass.Ⅱ[J].American Sociological Review,1988,53(1):1-8.
  • 3Ostrom,Elinor.A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action[J].American Political Science Review,1998,92:1-22.
  • 4Stevens,Joe B.The Economics of Collective Choice[M].Westview Press,Inc,1993.
  • 5Chong,D.Collective Action and The Civil Rights Movement[M].Chicago:Chicago University Press,1991.
  • 6Moore Barrington.Privacy[M].Armonk:M.E.Sharpe,1984.
  • 7Edel,Matthew.A Note on Collection Action,Marxism,and The Prisoner's Dilemma[J].Journal of Economic Issues,1979,13(3):751-761.
  • 8Taylor,Michael.Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action.In Michael Taylor(ed),Rationality and Revolution,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1988,pp.63-97.
  • 9Marwell,Gerald and Ruth E.Ames.Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods[J].American Journal of Sociology,1979,84:1335-1360.
  • 10Ostrom,Elinor.Collection Action and The Evolution of Social Norms[J].The Journal of Economic Perspectives,2000,14(3):137-158.

共引文献21

同被引文献64

  • 1张玉磊.整体性治理理论概述:一种新的公共治理范式[J].中共杭州市委党校学报,2015(5):54-60. 被引量:37
  • 2See, e.g. , Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004,pp. 12-13.
  • 3Robert O. Keohane, After He-gemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005, pp. 6,10-11.
  • 4Scott Barrett and Robert Stavins, Increasing Participation and Compliance in Interna- tional Climate Change Agreements, International Environmental Agreements : Politics, Law and Economics, Vol. 3,2003, pp. 351-353.
  • 5Eric A. Poser & Alan O. Sykes, International Law and the Limits of Macroeconomic Cooperation, Southern California LawReview, Vol. 81 Issue 5, 2013.
  • 6See Robert C. Ellickson, Oder without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994, pp. 130-131.
  • 7See Eric A. Poser & Alan O. Sykes, International Law and the Limits of Macroeconomic Cooperation, Southern Califor- nia Law Review, gol. 86 Issue 5,2013.
  • 8Joseph M. Grieeo, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: a Realist Cri- tique of the Newest Liberal Insttutionalism, International Organization, 42, 3, summer 1988, p. 497.
  • 9Helen Milner, International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses, World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3, 1992, p. 471.
  • 10Simon Lester and Inu Barbee, the Challenge of Cooperation: Regulatory Trade Barriers in the Transatlantic Trade and In- vestment Partnership, Journal of International Economic Law , Vol. 15, 2013,pp. 856-859.

引证文献3

二级引证文献19

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部