公司治理与高管政治联系的“双刃剑”效应

Double-edged Sword Effect of Political Connections between Corporate Governance and Senior Managers

高管政治联系具有"双刃剑"效应——"政府干预"作用与"关系"作用。本文从公司内部治理机制出发,考察公司治理对高管政治联系"双刃剑"效应的激励与约束作用。研究表明,公司治理质量越高,高管政治联系的"政府干预"作用越弱,"关系"作用越强。本文揭示了高管政治联系在政企关系中的"桥梁"角色,并提供了公司治理缓解高管与企业代理冲突的增量证据,有助于企业扬长避短、最优化政治联系的"双刃剑"效应。

Political connections of managers have the double- edged sword effect, i. e. ＂government intervention＂ and ＂guanxi＂ . This paper examines the influence of inner corporate governance mechanisms on the double- edged sword effect of political connections. It is found that the better corporate governance mechanisms, the weaker the government intervention effect and the stronger the guanxi effect. Our research reveals the bridge role of politically connected managers in the relation between the government and enterprises, and also provides the empirical evidence of corporate governance on the solving the agency conflict, which is helpful for enterprises to better take the effects of political connections.