四谓词理论中的“本质”——兼论现代哲学中本质主义的困境

On The Conception of Essence in Four Predicates:Reflection on the Dilemma in Essentialism of Modern Philosophy

四谓词是亚里士多德所建立的第一个逻辑理论。在四谓词理论中,"本质"是一个重要的概念,它是划分四类谓词的两个标准之一。亚里士多德认为,四类谓词中,属和定义谓述主词的本质,而偶性和特性不谓述主词的本质;本质指的是一种事物区别于其他所有事物的属性;而判断一个谓词是否谓述本质的标准是是否"更在先的"和"更清楚的"。在四谓词中,亚里士多德关注的是类的本质,而非个体的本质。本质在四谓词理论中既是一个本体论的范畴,又是一个认识论的范畴。本质的双重性质,决定了亚里士多德四谓词理论的失败,也体现了现代哲学中本质主义的困境。

The conception of essence plays an important role in the theory of four predicates as one of the two criteria of dividing predicates.From Aristotle＇s point of view,both genus and definition predicate the essence of the thing while the accident and property don＇t predicate the essence of the thing.In this paper,the author wants to point out that Aristotle was concentrating only on the essence of natural kinds,rather than people usually thinking of individuals.The conception of essence is both an ontological term and an epistemological term,which determines the failure of Aristotle＇s theory of four predicates,and which also embodies the dilemma in essentialism of modern philosophy.