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均匀行驶信用券计划管理瓶颈拥挤和方式划分 被引量:4

Uniform Travel Credit Scheme for Managing Bottleneck Congestion and Modal Split
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摘要 在相互竞争的双模式交通系统中,考虑用户异质性,本文探讨了均匀行驶信用券计划对方式划分和帕累托提高特性的影响.在这一计划下,政府首先发布一定数量的行驶信用券,并均匀地分发给每一位出行者,允许出行者根据自身需求在市场中自由购买或出售信用券.根据预先设定的行驶信用券收取规模,使用快速路的出行者将会在经过瓶颈时被收取一定数量的信用券.研究结果表明,均匀行驶信用券计划总能让一部分快速路出行者转向地铁模式;对于同质用户来说,无论信用券收取数量多少,帕累托提高特性始终成立,然而对于异质用户来说,只有当行驶信用券收取数量小于某一临界值时,帕累托提高特性才能满足. In a competitive two-mode network,this paper aims at exploring the effect of the uniform travel credit scheme on modal split and Pareto-improving property considering the heterogeneous VOT of users.Under the uniform travel credit scheme,the government initially issues a total amount of credits and distributes them to each eligible user in a uniform manner,which are allowed to trade in a competitive market.Therefore,travelers can buy or sell their credits according to their own travel need.An amount of uniform credits are charged for usage of highway bottleneck according to the pre-defined credit charging scales.The results show that the uniform travel credit scheme always makes some auto users transfer to transit mode to some extent,and the Pareto-improving property is always true for the homogeneous case whatever the credit charging scale is.However,for the heterogeneous case,the study shows that Pareto-improving property only satisfies when the credits charged at bottleneck are less than a critical value.
出处 《交通运输系统工程与信息》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2012年第6期126-131,共6页 Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology
基金 教育部人文社科研究青年基金(12YJCZH186)
关键词 城市交通 均匀行驶信用券计划 瓶颈模型 方式划分 用户异质性 urban traffic uniform travel credit scheme bottleneck model modal split user heterogeneity
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