“尊严”概念于生命伦理学无用吗?

Is the Concept of “Dignity” Useless to Life Ethics?

"尊严"于生命伦理学有用还是无用,是当前国际生命伦理学界的一个争论焦点。本文在回应"无用论"的同时,论证指出:第一,"尊严"不能被等同于"尊重",它有超出"尊重"的内涵"盈余";第二,在生命伦理学中,人的"尊严"不仅有用而且有大用,它是生命伦理学的基本价值观,其所内涵的"人的生命尊严"就是生命伦理学的核心价值。护卫生命的尊严就是生命伦理学的宗旨和使命。第三,"尊严"在实际应用时一般需要过渡和转化,即从价值观过渡和转化为根本伦理原则和若干基本原则;从价值转化为道德权利和法律权利。

Whether the concept of ＂human dignity＂ is useful or useless in the study of life ethics has be- come a main argument in the international academia of life ethics currently. This paper argues against the opin- ion that ＂Dignity is a useless concept in the study of life ethics＂. The paper holds that the concept of ＂dignity＂ cannot be viewed as an equivalent of ＂respect＂ because it has much broader and more profound surplus conno- tations than the latter. In the second place, the concept of ＂human dignity＂ in the study of life ethics is not merely being useful, but being of ＂great use＂ because it denotes the very basic values of life ethics and the con- notation of ＂human dignity of life＂ serves as one of its core values. Therefore, maintaining the dignity of life is the key purpose and mission of life ethics. Thirdly, the concept of ＂dignity＂ in practical ethics studies needs to be transmitted and transformed, in which life values are transmitted and transformed into the cardinal ethic prin- ciple and other basic principles and, in turn, into moral rights and legal rights.