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房地产销售代理行为分析及合约设计 被引量:2

Study on the Activities and Contracts of Real Estate's Sales Agent
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摘要 研究房地产销售代理活动中开发商和销售代理商各自的决策和行为,以设计出合理的房地产销售代理合约,从而充分激励房地产销售代理活动双方努力工作,提高房地产销售供应链的运作效率。研究表明,信息对称情况下,销售代理商风险规避,房地产销售代理合约应采用固定报酬形式,销售代理商的最优努力水平与其自身的能力水平呈正相关,与其成本系数成负相关。在信息不对称情况下,宜采用固定金额报酬加产出分成的形式。信息不对称情况下,销售代理商分享产出的比例与代理商的风险偏好程度成正相关,与外生的不确定性呈负相关,与代理商的成本系数呈负相关。同时,固定报酬金额应大于一定值,销售代理商才会接受开发商的委托。并且,信息不对称情况下代理商的工作努力水平低于信息对称情况下。 Through the research on the decisions and activities of real estate developers and sales agents,to design a proper sales agent agreement and consequently fully stimulate both sides of real estate sales agent activities to work hard,enhance the operational efficiency of the real estate sales supply chain.In the condition of information symmetry,risk aversion of sales agents,the fixed payment form that should be adopt in the agreement and the optimal effort level of sales agents have positive correlation with their efforts and have negative correlation with the cost coefficient.In the condition of information asymmetry,it is better to adopt the payment form as the fixed amount plus output distribution.According to the research,in the condition of information asymmetry,the share ratio of the agents has positive correlation with the agents' risk preference degree,and has negative correlation with their cost coefficient and external uncertainty.At one time,only if the fixed amount of payment is greater than a certain value,can the sales agents accept the commission of developers.Also,agent's hard working degree in the condition of information symmetry is lower than that in the condition of information symmetry.
作者 杨峰 管百海
出处 《技术经济与管理研究》 2013年第2期3-6,共4页 Journal of Technical Economics & Management
基金 教育部人文社科青年基金项目(09YJC630020) 中国博士后科学基金特别资助项目(201003691)
关键词 房地产销售 销售代理 企业管理 管理决策 Real estate sales Sales agent Enterprise management Management decision
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参考文献9

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二级参考文献18

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