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最低质量标准下企业进入的策略性行为选择

The Strategic Entry Behavior Choices of Firms under Minimum Quality Standard
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摘要 一个行业的竞争力和绩效水平往往要受到行业进入条件和容易程度的影响。对于进入者而言,制约进入的根本技术因素是最低质量标准。在差异化产品市场中,无最低质量标准的限制且进入成本较小时,进入者无论是以高质量进入还是以低质量进入,所获得的利润是一样的,而在内生最低质量标准限制情况下,在位者和进入者达成竞争均衡时的利润有很大的差异,最低质量标准改变了在位者和进入者的质量选择,在位者是高质量产品企业所获得的利润小于在位者是低质量产品企业时所获得的利润,因此,如果在位者能够自由选择质量,在位者有可能选择生产低质量产品,进入者可能选择生产高质量产品,这导致产品市场的竞争不足。在这种情况下,政府应为企业创造开放与竞争的市场环境和政策导向。 An industry's competitiveness and the level of performance tend to be subject to the entry conditions and the ease of entry.For entrants,the basic entry technological constraint is the minimum quality standards.In differentiated products markets,when there is no minimum quality standard and the entry cost is small,the entrants's profit is the same,whether they choose the high quality or low quality to enter the product market.While in the case of endogenous minimum quality standards,the incumbent and the entrant can reach a different competitive equilibrium profit,the minimum quality standard change the quality selection of the incumbent and the entrant.The high-quality incumbent's profit is less than that of low-quality incumbent,so if the incumbent is free to choose the quality of product,it may choose to produce low quality products,and the entrant may choose to produce high quality products.Which lead to the lack of competition in product markets.Therefore,government should create an open and competitive market environment and efficient policy guidance for firms.
作者 何慧爽
出处 《技术经济与管理研究》 2013年第2期7-11,共5页 Journal of Technical Economics & Management
基金 教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(12YJC630056) 河南省科技厅软科学项目(122400450463)
关键词 质量标准 进入阻止 产品质量 产品市场 Quality standards Entry deterrence Product quality Product market
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参考文献7

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