董事会监督与总经理激励对绩效的影响——基于我国中小板家族企业研究

The Board of Directors Supervision and General Manager Incentive to the Influence of the Performance——Based on Small and Medium-sized Plate Family Enterprise Research

公司治理中的监督机制和激励机制是解决代理问题的基本途径和方式。大部分研究的重点都放在如何建立或改善激励机制,或者研究公司内部监督机制。然而公司治理中的治理机制并不是单独发挥作用的,而是相互作用,对公司的绩效产生影响。本文将董事会监督和总经理激励相结合构建模型,回归研究两者结合对企业绩效的综合影响,并进一步研究董事会监督与总经理激励之间的相互作用。通过实证研究发现董事长与总经理兼任情况、独立董事比例、董事会持股比例、董事会董事前三名薪酬与企业绩效并不显著,而董事会会议是显著的;总经理薪酬与企业绩效呈显著正相关关系,而总经理持股比例与企业绩效不相关;董事会监督与总经理激励是同方向变化,共同对企业绩效作用。

The corporate governance of the supervision mechanism and incentive mechanism to solve the problem of agency is the basic ways and the way.Most of the recent research focus has on how to establish and improve the incentive mechanism,or research company internal supervision mechanism.However the governance mechanism and corporate governance is not a single play a role,but the interaction,the company＇s performance impact.This paper will board supervision and general manager incentive combined constructing model,regression research on enterprise performance combination of comprehensive influence,and further research board supervision and the interaction between the general manager incentive.Through the empirical study found that the chairman and general manager concurrently,the proportions of the independent directors of the board of directors,the shareholding ratio of the directors of the board,the top three compensation and enterprise performance is not significant,but that the board of directors meeting is significant.The general manager compensation and enterprise performance is a significant positive correlation,and general manager shareholding proportion and enterprise performance not related.The board of directors supervision and general manager incentive is looking together in the same direction change,common to the enterprise performance function.