股份支付并购中存在不同的盈余管理吗?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Accrual-based or Real Earnings Management in Share-payment M&As: Empirical Evidence for China Listed Companies

本文从收购方的视角，以2008-2010在并购过程中采用股份支付方式的中国上市公司为样本，实证考察了中国上市公司在股份支付并购中的盈余管理机会主义行为以及对并购绩效的影响。研究结果发现：收购方在并购前半年存在显著正向应计盈余管理机会主义行为；在并购当期存在显著正向真实盈余管理机会主义行为；并购后一年公司业绩的下降程度受到应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理的交替影响；股份支付并购是促使公司管理层产生盈余管理的动机之一，并且对并购后一年绩效显著下降具有一定的解释力度。

In this paper, we examine both accrual-based and real earning management activities around share payment M＆A based on the related data of listed company from 2008 to 2010. We show that acquiring firms engage in significant positive accrual-based manipulation preceding merger announcement while significant positive real manipulation in merger announcement. We also find that operating underperformance in the year following M＆A is driven not only by accrual-based activities reversal, but also reflect the negative consequences of real earning manipulation because real abnormal behavior is minimized over the long nan. Our results explained earning management is one of the reasons why post-M＆A operating performance of acquiring firms is declined in the long run.