法律环境、分析师跟进与盈余管理

Law Environment,Financial Analysts Following and Earnings Management

本文以2004年至2010年分析师跟进并出具盈余预测研究报告的上市公司为样本,研究了作为外部公司治理机制的分析师跟进和法律环境对上市公司盈余管理行为的抑制作用。研究发现,分析师跟进与法律环境对于上市公司的正向盈余管理行为具有显著的抑制作用,但对上市公司的负向盈余管理的抑制作用并不显著。在上市公司所处地区的投资者保护法律环境较弱的情况下,分析师跟进发挥了更强的外部监督作用,表现为分析师跟进与上市公司正向盈余管理程度的负相关性更强。在控制了分析师跟进与盈余管理之间的内生性问题后,上述结论仍然成立。本文的研究,为从分析师跟进和法律环境两个维度理解上市公司外部治理机制对盈余管理的制约作用提供了实证证据。

Based on a sample of listed companies which followed by financial analyst during 2004-2010 years, this paper stud- ies the relationship between external governance mechanisms and the earning management of public companies, which including the numbers of financial analysts and investor protection law environment. It finds that the number of financial analyst following and the investor protection law environment are significant negative with the positive earnings management of public companies, but they have insignificant relationship with the negative earnings management of public companies. When those companies in the region in which the investor protection legal environment is weak, the number of financial analyst following play a stronger external governance mech＇ anism, which is more significant negative with the positive earning management of public companies. Those findings are still hold even if we controlled the endogeneity of the number financial analyst following and provide empirical evidence to facilitate understand the relationship between external governance mechanisms and the earning management of public companies.