摘要
过去四十多年来,索萨为一种复杂和深刻的知识理论提供了强有力的辩护,开辟了一个新的知识论流派,即德性知识论。这是一种基于理智德性的知识理论,它试图从信念形成的过程可靠性转向认知主体能力的可靠性,从而为知识寻找一个更为宽泛和稳定的基础。然而,一方面它可能具有可靠主义的通病,例如普遍性问题,另一方面,他的德性概念过于单薄,而且基本上是后果论式的,在解释力上存在缺陷。尽管如此,这是一条通向知识的希望之途。
Over the past forty years, Sosa provides a strong defense for a complex and profound theory of knowledge, which opens up a new genre epistemo[ogy, viz. virtue epistemology. It is a theory of knowledge based on intellectual virtue, and tries to shift from process reliability of belief formation to reliability of faculty of epistemic subject, and then looks for a more broad and stable base for knowledge. However, on the one hand, it may have a common problem of reliabilism, such as the problem of universality; on the other hand, his concept of virtue is too thin, and basically consequentialist, which has defects in explanatory power. Nevertheless, it is an hopeful approach to knowledge.
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第1期8-13,共6页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
基金
教育部人文社会科学青年基金"德性
真理与知识--当代德性知识论研究"(12YJC720005)
关键词
德性知识论
理智德性
可靠性
索萨
Virtue Epistemology
Intellectual. Virtue
Reliability
Sosa