索萨的德性知识论:问题与前景

Sosa's Virtue Epistemology: Problems and Prospects

过去四十多年来,索萨为一种复杂和深刻的知识理论提供了强有力的辩护,开辟了一个新的知识论流派,即德性知识论。这是一种基于理智德性的知识理论,它试图从信念形成的过程可靠性转向认知主体能力的可靠性,从而为知识寻找一个更为宽泛和稳定的基础。然而,一方面它可能具有可靠主义的通病,例如普遍性问题,另一方面,他的德性概念过于单薄,而且基本上是后果论式的,在解释力上存在缺陷。尽管如此,这是一条通向知识的希望之途。

Over the past forty years, Sosa provides a strong defense for a complex and profound theory of knowledge, which opens up a new genre epistemo[ogy, viz. virtue epistemology. It is a theory of knowledge based on intellectual virtue, and tries to shift from process reliability of belief formation to reliability of faculty of epistemic subject, and then looks for a more broad and stable base for knowledge. However, on the one hand, it may have a common problem of reliabilism, such as the problem of universality; on the other hand, his concept of virtue is too thin, and basically consequentialist, which has defects in explanatory power. Nevertheless, it is an hopeful approach to knowledge.