摘要
运用演化博弈论的方法,建立高校科研经费管理者与使用者关于科研经费监管的演化博弈模型,分析该条件下科研经费控制的稳定状态,讨论博弈过程中双方的策略选择,并给出关于高校科研经费监管的启示与建议。
To make an evolutionary game model of supervising research funds between managers and users in institutes of higher education with evolutionary game theory, the paper analyzes the stable states on controlling research funds, discusses the strategy selections of double sides in the game and provides the inspirations and proposals on controlling the funds.
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第2期77-80,共4页
Science and Technology Management Research
关键词
演化博弈分析
演化稳定策略
科研经费
监管
evolutionary game analysis
evolutionary stable strategy
research funds
supervision
