基于博弈论的制造企业开展全生命周期服务的策略研究

Research on the Strategy of Manufacturing Enterprise Carrying Out Service in Full Life Cycle Based on Game Theory

以顾客对服务的理性感知为前提,建立了制造企业在产品全生命周期内开展服务的双寡头博弈模型,并进行了Nash均衡求解.数值模拟了服务质量边际成本系数和顾客初始服务价格感知系数变动对该模型均衡解的动态变化过程.指出了制造企业开展产品全生命周期服务后,制造企业和独立服务企业均能获益,服务均衡定价随服务质量边际成本系数的增加而递增,随顾客初始服务价格感知系数的增加而递减.随着产品剩余寿命的减少,制造企业需要降低服务质量和服务价格,才能占领独立服务企业的服务范围.

This article established a duopoly game model of manufacturing enterprises carrying out services in the product life cycle with the premise of customer＇s rational perception of service,and developed Nash equilibrium of the game model.With the method of numerical simulation,the dynamic process under the change of variable influence factors was displayed.The result shows that,when the manufacturing enterprises carry out the product life cycle services,manufacturers and independent service companiescan both have benefits from the service market.With marginal cost of service quality factor increasing,the balanced price of service increases,however,with the customer perception of the initial service price factor increasing,the price decreases.As the remaining life of product reduces,manufacturers need to reduce service quality and price to occupy the independent service company＇s service area.