不完全信息下基于双目标的博弈并购决策研究

The Decision-making Research of M&A under Incomplete Information Based on the Two Goals

建立复合实物期权模型,研究并购企业在竞争环境下满足收益最大化和并购成功概率最大化的并购决策问题。基于并购企业对竞争对手企业价值补偿值具有不完全信息的现实,运用实物期权博弈的方法,以企业期望价值收益最大化和成功并购概率最大化为目标,建立并购决策模型并求解最优并购时机,在此基础上进行并购决策分析,通过数值比较,得到并购企业的若干策略选择。研究结果表明,不完全信息下存在竞争的并购企业的期望收益小于完全垄断下的期望收益,即竞争因素削弱了并购的实物期权价值;并购企业在与对手企业进行并购博弈时,并购企业给目标企业的价值补偿越高,其最优并购时机越迟;不完全信息下若使并购企业期望收益最大的溢价比例不在溢价比例概率分布的区间内,则并购企业应取区间内的最大值,并购企业可以获得最大的期望收益和最大的成功并购概率;反之,使并购企业期望收益最大的溢价比例在概率分布内,企业取该溢价比例时可获得最大的期望收益,但企业需要在获得最大收益和增大成功并购概率之间权衡,当溢价比例取值越高时,并购时机越迟,所获收益也就越大。

The paper establishes a compound real option model to study the decision-making of M＆A enterprises for meeting the revenue maximization and successful M＆A probability maximization in a competitive environment. First, the paper introduces the reality that the M＆A enterprise possesses incomplete information of value compensation on competitors. Then, the paper uses real option game with the revenue maximization and successful M＆A probability maximization as the goal to establish the decision model of M＆A and solves for the optimal M＆A timing. Last, the paper analyzes the M＆A decision-making on the basis of the a- bove conclusions. And we get the strategy selection of the M＆A enterprise by numerical comparison. The results shows that the expected return of the M＆A enterprise in the competition under incomplete information is less than the that in the perfect monopo- ly under complete information. Competitive factors weak the value of M＆A real options. When the M＆A enterprise is in M＆A game with competitors, the higher value compensation the M＆A enterprise offers to the target enterprise, the later the best M＆A opportunity produces. Under incomplete information, when the proportion of the premium that obtains the maximum expected re- turn of M＆A enterprise is not included in the probability distribution, the M＆A enterprise should take the maximum value for getting the largest expected return and the largest successful M＆A probability. On the contrary, when the proportion of the premi- um that obtains the maximum expected return of M＆A enterprise is included in the probability distribution, the M＆A enterprise can take this proportion of the premium to maximize the expected return with lacking of largest successful M＆A probabihty. The M＆A enterprise should balance between the largest return and successful M＆A probability, because increased proportion of the premium receives high returns with delaying M＆A opportunity.