“理由”的概念与黑格尔的目的性本体论

The Concept of “Reason” and Hegel's Teleological Ontology

自从古希腊哲学发韧 ,对于存在者之存在的本质的发问便被放置到对存在者之存在根据 (理由 )的探索之中。在理性本体论产生之后 ,事物存在的“理由”往往是从其合理性方面得到解释。这里知性形而上学与辩证法的立场是根本不同的。黑格尔对理性本体论的扬弃主要在于 ,旧的形而上学本体论实际上是一种“本质性的本体论” ,而思辨哲学则是一种“目的性的本体论”。但它们都仍然属于本体论上的理由解释的层面。在本世纪哲学从认识论上的“理由”重新回到存在之本质的追问的总体思想语境之中 。

Since the very beginning of Hellenic philosophy, the enguiry into the essence of being has been replaced by the exploration of “reason”(Grund) of the existence of thing(Seiend). With the advent of the rationalistic ontology, the reason for the existence of Seiend mostly tends to be interpreted as its rationality. Here, the standpoint of the old metaphysics of understanding is essentially different from that of dialectics. The Hegelian sublation of rationalist ontology lay mostly in that the speculative philosophy enters into the plane of a “teleological ontology”, while the old metaphysical ontology still remained in the horizon of “eidological ontology”.Nonetheless, both of them are developed in the scope of the “Grund” interpretation. In the overall conceptual context in the twentieth century, in which philosophies resort again to the acient enquiry after the essence of being, rather than the epistemological explanation of reason, the Hegelian teleological theory regained its special significance.