下游风险约束下的供应链博弈与合作研究

Study on Stackelberg Game of Supply Chain and Cooperation with Downside Risk Constraint

考虑了由风险中立的单供应商和风险规避的单零售商组成的二级供应链,分别建立了分散决策下和回购契约下供应商占主导地位的Stackelberg博弈模型,求得了均衡解.并研究了零售商下游风险参数值对博弈决策的影响,研究发现当零售商期望目标利润较大时,风险约束下的回购契约机制将无效,且期望目标利润越大则供应商和零售商利润越小,最后用算例对这一结论进行了说明.

Considering a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral supplier and a downside-risk-averse retailer, a Stackelberg game model in which supplier is a leader is established with buyback contract, and the equilibrium solutions are gained. The influence of the retailer＇s downside-risk value on Stackelberg game decision is discussed. The study shows that when retailer＇s target profit is big, the buyback contract mechanism with downside-risk constrain is no longer effective, and the bigger the target profit is, the smaller supplier and retailer＇s profit is, the findings are illustrated by a numerical example.