跨国公司转让定价规制博弈与税务执法能力

The Game Model of Regulation of Multinational Corporation's Transfer Pricing and the Importance of Host Government's Tax Law Enforcement Capacity

假设东道国政府将追求社会福利最大化作为规制跨国公司转让定价行为的最终目标,分别构建了东道国政府与跨国公司之间有关转让定价规制的静态博弈和动态博弈模型,揭示了东道国政府的税务执法能力对其针对跨国公司转让定价进行规制的效果的影响机理,指出了东道国政府加强税务执法能力建设的重要性,并提出了具体的政策建议.

This paper assumes that the host government will pursue the maximization of social welfare as the ultimate goal of the regulation of multinational corporation＇s transfer pricing behavior, establishes the static and dynamic game model of transfer pricing regulation between the host government and multinational corporation, reveals the mechanism how the host government＇s tax law enforcement ability infiuents the regulation of multinational corporation＇s transfer pricing, points out the importance host government improves its tax administration ability, and points out some specific policy proposals.