公开增发新股与定向增发新股中盈余管理的比较研究

A Comparative Study of Earnings Management between Seasoned Public Offering and Directional Seasoned Offering

文章采用大股东与小股东代理理论对我国上市公司公开增发新股与定向增发新股中的盈余管理问题进行了研究。研究发现,由于大股东在股权再融资中存在获取私人利益的动机,上市公司在公开增发新股和定向增发新股前都存在盈余管理现象,但公开增发新股前进行的是正的盈余管理,而定向增发新股前进行盈余管理的方式与定向增发新股的类型有关。

By employing the agency theory of major shareholders and minority shareholders, this paper conducts a study of the earnings management problem of China＇s listed companies concerning the seasoned public offering and directional seasoned offering. The results indicate that because the major shareholders have the motives of obtaining their private interests in the equity refinancing, there exists the phenomenon of earnings management in the listed companies before their seasoned public offering and directional seasoned offering. However, before the seasoned public offering the earnings management is positive, while before the directional seasoned offering the method of earnings manage- ment is related to the types of the directional seasoned offering.