阻止信息收集的供应链契约

Supply chain contracts that deter information gathering

针对内生信息结构下供应链中阻止信息收集的问题,建立一个非线性规划模型.研究发现,存在一个作为给出不同契约参考点的信息收集成本阈值,进而给出了不同信息收集成本下阻止信息收集的契约,分析比较两种不同契约下供销双方的决策和收益,并且证明了当信息收集成本大于信息收集成本阈值时,供应商更愿意阻止信息收集.此时,供应商获得相对更好的收益,而销售商获得保留收益.最后给出的数值算例验证了主要结论.

For the problem of deterring information gathering in supply chain under endogenous information structure, a non-linear program model is constructed. The results show that there exists a threshold value of information gathering cost as a reference for offering the contract. Then the supply chain contracts that deter information gathering are proposed under different information gathering costs, and the decisions and profits of the supplier and retailer are analyzed. Furthermore, it is verified that the supplier prefers to deter information gathering when the information gathering cost is lager than the threshold value. In this case, the supplier gets more profit whereas the retailer receives his reserved profit. Finally, a numerical example is presented to verify the main results.