物流负外部性及其政府规制

Negative Externalities of Logistics and Its Government Regulations

通过建立博弈模型,对企业与企业、企业与政府在实施绿色治理物流负外部性的过程中的博弈行为及企业与政府之间的合谋行为进行了分析。分析结果表明,在政府规制前提下,为了激励企业实施绿色物流,政府应尽量减少监督检查成本,并对负外部性比较严重的企业加以重罚,对实施绿色物流的企业给予补贴,以提高企业实施绿色物流的积极性;另外,在进行政府规制的过程中,必须制定严格的监督机制、奖惩机制和利益协调机制,增加企业寻租的成本和风险,尽量避免企业和政府合谋行为的产生。

Based on the game models established in this paper, the game behavior which between enterprises and enterprises, enterprises and the government has been analyzed in the process of governing the logistics nega- tive externalities by implementing green logistics. The results show that, under the premise of the government regu- lation, In order to encourage enterprises to implement green logistics, the government should minimize the cost of supervision and inspection, punish severely the enterprises with serious negative externalities, so as to enhance their initiative to implement green logistics. In addition, during the process of government regulation, rigorous mo- nitoring mechanisms, incentive mechanisms and the coordination mechanisms of interests should be established, so as to avoid the collusion between enterprises and the government.