关联并购中董事会独立性与收购公司的股东价值分析

Independence of Board in Relative M&A and Shareholder Wealth of the Acquired Company

董事会作为现代公司治理机制的核心,在关联并购中起着重要作用。本文以董事会独立性为研究视角,运用博弈模型从理论上研究了关联并购中董事会独立性和股东价值之间的相互关系。研究发现,独立董事的引入能有效提升收购公司的股东价值,而且在公司董事会规模一定的条件下,董事会独立性和收购公司的股东价值呈正相关关系。最后,本文结合中国实际,提出了进一步加强董事会独立性的政策建议。

As the core of the modern internal decision-making and governance mechanisms,the Board plays an important role in M&A.In this paper,the author theoretically studies the relationship between the independence of the Board and shareholder wealth in Relative M&A.The studying found that the independence of board can effectively enhance wealth of the acquired company.Under certain board size conditions,positive correlation can be found between the independence of the Board and the shareholders wealth.In the end,the author proposes some policies to further strengthen the independence of the Board.