保荐人制度在中国股市蜕变为寻租制的经济学分析

An Economic Analysis to the Transmutation of Sponsor System into “Rent-seeking System” in Chinese Stock Market

保荐人制度是已被成熟证券市场证明行之有效的证券发行监管措施。中国于2004年引入该制度,并运用在主板和创业板市场上。八年来,对保荐人制度规范我国证券发行所起作用的质疑从未停止,诸多实例表明,原本预期的提高上市公司质量、保护投资者利益的效能并未很好发挥,保荐人制度甚至发展成为一种低风险高收益的寻租制,发生了橘淮为枳的变异。基于保荐人、监管者个人的"成本-收益"分析及各方的博弈分析表明,在当前的监管惩罚力度下,保荐人有动机与发行公司合谋造假上市。只有建立对监管者的有效"激励-约束"机制,才能强化对新股发行过程中违法违规行为的惩戒力度,让保荐人真正负起保荐职责。

The sponsor system has been proved by many mature stock markets to be an effective supervisory measure of securities.In 2004,the sponsor system was introduced and applied in the Main Board and GEM in China.In the past eight years,there always existed great controversies concerning the sponsor system＇s effectiveness in regulating security issuing practice in China.As has been proved by many practical cases,the expected functions to improve the quality of registered companies,and to protect investors＇ interests have not been brought into full play.To some extent,the sponsor system has become a low-risk and high-rewarding rent-seeking system and the sponsor＇s role has experienced serious transmutation.Game analysis concerning cost-benefit balance among the sponsor and the monitor shows that in current monitor and punishment system,the securities issuers,the official regulatory individuals,and the sponsor are highly motivated to conspire with each other and issue fake securities.In order to change such ＂stimulation and constraint＂ predicament,it is obligatory to establish effective incentive and restraint mechanisms,and to strengthen the punishment of violation in issuing new securities,so that the sponsor can well fulfill his or her duty.