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市场、政府与企业:不完全市场、内生的经济组织与要素市场改革 被引量:3

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摘要 在不完全的市场情况下,企业家与政府的关系决定了均衡中的所有权形式,随着市场的完善,企业家与政府的关系以及经济中所有权模式也会发生相应变化。通过一个简捷模型的研究表明,在不完全市场的情况下,均衡的产权形式和组织形式与完全市场下的产权形式和组织形式有很大的区别:政治家和企业家之间在多个"市场"上的合作是对市场缺失的一种反应,产权和组织形式往往采取了在多个"市场"上互联的关系这种形式。全面的市场化改革可以促进这种关系的解体,从而促进产权形式的改变,而局部的自由化(市场化)改革未必会导致私有化的出现,经济转型会出现多重均衡。
作者 王永钦 张熙
出处 《学习与探索》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第1期101-107,共7页 Study & Exploration
基金 教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"(2008) 国家社会科学基金重大项目(12&2D074) 复旦大学"985工程三期整体推进社会科学研究项目" 上海市重点学科建设项目(B101) 上海市浦江人才计划(2011)
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参考文献10

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二级参考文献31

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