我国中央企业审计委托模式变革的理论分析与实证检验

Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Examination of the Reform Effect of Audit Delegation Model in Central Enterprises

我国中央企业的审计委托权自2004年开始陆续从管理者行权转向产权所有者行权,演化博弈分析显示这会促使央企的独立审计向着高质量审计演化,对2004～2008年由产权所有者行使审计委托权的央企与由管理者行权的一般企业的审计意见购买行为的有序Logit实证检验显示央企不能成功购买审计意见,而一般企业能够。由此,一般企业审计质量的提高可从改革审计委托模式着手,通过寻求产权所有者行权的变通模式来使独立审计行业形成一种趋向于高质量审计的良性循环机制。

The audit delegation right in central enterprises in our country changed from managements to property owners in 2004. The evolutionary game analysis shows that independent audit in central enterprises is of higher quality than general enterprises. The ordinal Logit empirical examination of audit opinion shopping of central enterprises with property owners who exercise the audit delegation right and general enterprises with managements who excise the right suggests that the latter could be successful in shopping audit opinion while the former couldn＇t. The improvement of audit quality could start from the reform of audit delegation model in general enterprises, then form a virtuous cycle of high-quality audit mechanisms by seeking alternative delegation modes of the property owners exercising the audit delegation right all over the independent audit industry.