政府竞争、可信承诺与地方政府行为异质性——基于省际面板数据的经验证据

Government Competition,Credible Commitment and Differences of Individual Behavior of Local Government——Based on Empirical Evidence of the Inter-Provincial Panel Data

当前解释中国发展经验的理论中,一个比较成熟的理论解释是地方政府竞争是中国经济飞速发展的推动力,这种竞争由两种机制所构成,一种是财政上的分权,另一种是政治上的集权。地方政府竞争理论隐含了在中央与地方的互动中"中央—地方"间的承诺都是可信的这一条件,所以上述两种机制必定会对地方政府产生强激励。可是这一理论没办法解释地方政府行为的差异性这一现象,而其实这种差异性在纵向的时间维度和横向的空间维度都是存在的,因此探讨地方政府行为的影响因素,弄清楚造成地方政府行为差异性的原因非常重要。通过面板数据分析可得出结论,"中央—地方"间的可信承诺是造成地方政府行为差异的一个重要因素。在中央—地方博弈过程中,中央信守承诺的可能性越大,地方政府越可能按照中央希望的那样成为地方经济发展的扶助者。而"中央—地方"间可信承诺的达成,必须依靠纵向的权力制约。

Among current theories on interpreting China's development experience,a more mature theory is that local government competition is the driving force of China's rapid economic growth.The competition is posed by two mechanisms,the fiscal decentralization,and the political centralization.This theory implies that the commitment between 'central-local' is credible,with a strong incentive to local government.However,this theory cannot explain the phenomenon of the differences of individual behavior of the local government.In the central-local game process,the greater the likelihood of the central keeping its promise is,the more likely the local government would become who supports the local economic development as the central government hopes.The achievement of credible commitment between 'central-local' must rely on the vertical power restraints.