考虑融资需求的供应链双边激励机制

Coordinating Supply Chain with Bilateral Incentive Mechanism under Cash-constrained

对于由单一零售商和单一制造商组成的供应链,当资金不足的零售商获得融资后,由于发生融资费用,无法实现最优订购。为此,本文提出融资费用共担和转移支付的双边激励机制,由制造商和零售商共担融资费用,且零售商给予制造商一定的转移支付。研究发现,通过相关参数设定,信息对称时,可实现供应链的最优订购,有效分配利润,完美协调供应链;当零售商的自有资金信息不对称时,这种机制能够激励零售商提供真实的资金信息,控制零售商逆向选择的风险,实现最优订购,达到供应链协调。

As for the supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one under cash-constrained retailer, the optimal order cannot be achieved due to financing cost of the retailer. So, this paper proposes the bilateral incentive contact that the manufacturer shares financing cost with the retailer as an incentive, meanwhile, the retailer offers transfer payment to manufacturer. By setting contract parameter, under information symmetry, the optimal order quantity can achieved, the profits can be allocated arbitrarily and supply chain can be coordinated perfectly; under internal capital information asymmetry, the contract can encourage retailer to reveal real information and control the reverse selectiot effectively, optimal order and coordination of supply chain can be achieved.