摘要
我国实施政府采购取得了长足的进步,但由于管理经验、制度设计等方面的不足,在实践中出现了较为严重的权力寻租与腐败现象。本文结合经济学、管理学、法学的理论和方法阐述寻租行为发生的经济环境和制度背景,利用博弈论的方法,构建政府、政府采购人员和供应商之间的博弈模型分析寻租行为发生的机理,给出降低寻租行为的政策建议。
Great progress has been made in government procurement in our country, but due to the lack of managerial expe- rience and defects in system design, power rent-seeking and corruption occur in the procurement practice. The article studies the macro-economic environment and institutional background of rent-seeking by the economic, managerial, legal approaches, and analyzes the mechanism of rent-seeking on the game models, and provides feasible suggestions in policy-making to pre- vent corruption and misdeeds in the procurement.
出处
《广西财经学院学报》
2012年第6期74-77,共4页
Journal of Guangxi University of Finance and Economics
关键词
政府采购
寻租
博弈
government procurement
power rent-seeking
the Game Theory