摘要
文章基于国内外关于审计师选择以及财务分析师盈余预测的相关研究,从委托代理假设、信号传递假设的角度分析了财务分析师在对企业进行盈余分析时,能否认知审计师选择这一信息。研究结果显示,财务分析师的盈余预测与审计师选择呈正向相关,但是不显著,说明了财务分析师对审计师选择信息的认知度较弱,我国的资本市场还存在信息传递误区,以及上市公司内部存在代理冲突等问题。
Based on national and foreign studies about the relevance between the selection of auditor and the financial analyst earnings forecasts, this paper analyzes the possibility of whether a financial analyst can recognize the selection of auditor when he forecasts the earnings of a corporation from the perspective of principal-agent assumptions and the signaling hypoth- esis. The finding indicates that financial analysts' earnings forecasts and auditor selection was positive but not very signifi- cantly correlated, which means that the financial analyst shows weak cognition to the selection of auditor. There are misunder- standing in information transmission and principal-agent conflicts within listed companies.
出处
《广西财经学院学报》
2012年第6期101-105,共5页
Journal of Guangxi University of Finance and Economics
关键词
审计师选择
财务分析师
盈余分析
selection of auditor
financial analyst
earning analysis