美国商业判断规则:基于风险偏好和高管信义义务利益冲突的分析

Business Judegment: From the Perspective of Tension between the Risk-taking Inclination and Fiduciary Duty of Directors

本文主要探讨的是作为公司治理方式之一的商业判断规则的适用问题,重点探讨在公司风险偏好和高管信义、义务冲突与利益角逐状况下,如何实施商业判断规则。本文的视角主要是美国的商业判断规则司法适用问题。从最初的"理性人"标准到独立的"善意"标准的探讨,得出的结论是:最终的规则是要达到一种平衡。目前全球金融危机蔓延,给公司治理结构中的董事权利和追责机制,提出了新的思考。

In this thesis, the emphasis will be put on the discussion of the key rule in the U. S About the corporate governance： the business judgment rule and its judicial application provided that the there is an ever-existed tension of interest between the inclination of risk-taking about the directors and the fiduciary duty. My argument will start from the reasonable person standard, to the good faith standard and finally to the opinion of keeping good faith as an element of the duty of loyalty, which makes definitely in contradict with the standard above. Naturally, every standard has its pros and cons. At last, all my arguments converge into the conclusion that the standard in stone case will arrive at the balance of various interests, especially in the context of global financial crisis. However, my argument is not extended about the transplant of the standard into China, which I think, deserve more extensive analysis for example, sociology.