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互补或替代? 经理薪酬与外部审计治理效用关系研究 被引量:8

Complementary or Substitution? Research on the Relationship between Executive Compensation and Governance Utility of External Audit
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摘要 已有文献表明,经理薪酬激励与外部审计都会影响企业价值;但经理薪酬作为一种激励机制、外部审计作为一种监督机制,它们在影响企业价值时存在什么关系,尽管已有文献在理论上提及,但缺乏实证方面的证据。本文以沪深两市2005-2009年间的A股上市公司作为研究样本,通过实证研究发现,经理薪酬与外部审计对企业价值都有正向影响,而且经理薪酬与外部审计在影响企业价值时具有显著的替代关系;同时,这一关系受到经理人力资本密度和企业性质的显著影响。 Existing literatures indicated that both executive compensation incentives and external audit affect enterprise value.Executive compensation and external audit are regarded as an incentive mechanism and a monitoring mechanism respectively.Although the relationship between them while affecting enterprise value was theoretically mentioned by preceding literatures,there is a paucity of empirical evidence about this issue.Based on a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2005-2009,empirical study finds that both executive compensation and external audit have positive effect on enterprise value,there is a significant alternative relationship between them when they affect enterprise value,and that the density of manager human capital and the firm nature have significantly impacts on the alternative relationship.
作者 罗宏 刘宝华
出处 《会计与经济研究》 北大核心 2012年第6期3-11,共9页 Accounting and Economics Research
基金 国家社会科学基金项目(10XJL0012) 西南财经大学211工程三期建设项目 西南财经大学校管课题(2010XG076)
关键词 经理薪酬 外部审计 公司治理 企业价值 executive compensation external audit corporation governance enterprise value
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