产权性质视角下的银行业审计质量与经济利益关系研究——基于偏最小二乘法的估计

Banking Industry′s Audit Quality and Economy Interest from the Angle of Property Right: Based on PLS

以中国2001—2010年A股上市商业银行为研究样本,运用偏最小二乘法,检验不同产权性质的商业银行支付给审计师的经济利益与审计质量的关联性。研究发现:相对于非政府控制的上市银行,政府控制的上市银行支付给审计师的经济利益越大,盈余管理幅度越高;在为政府控制银行提供业务的过程中,银行给予审计师的经济利益过高,导致审计师未能有效地抑制银行的盈余管理行为,审计质量受损,而在为非政府控制的上市银行提供业务情形中,审计质量并未随着经济利益的增加而降低。

Applying partial least squares estimation method, the study examines the relationship be- tween audit quality and economy interest provided by commercial banks with different property right, by u- sing data of Chinese listed commercial banks from 2001 to 2010. The results indicate that, relative to non - government controlled banks, government controlled banks have higher earnings management when provi- ding auditors with more economy interest. When auditors provide services for government controlled banks, higher economy interest induces auditors to meet clients＇ preference of earnings management, and hence au- dit quality is impaired, but this case in not demonstrated in non-government controlled banks.