摘要
基于我国省级主要官员变更事件,文章检验了区域政策不确定性对企业投资行为的影响。研究发现,预期官员变更当年政策的不确定性,企业会显著减少当年投资,而这一影响主要体现在省级控制的国有企业,当经济处于上行期或管理层不具有政治身份时,换届的经济后果更加明显。进一步研究显示,官员变更会影响投资者定价,上市公司股票收益波动率显著提高。实证结果表明,地方政府政策是影响经济资源分配的重要因素,降低政策不确定性有利于本地上市公司投资效率的提高。
Based on the turnover events of main officials at provincial level in China, this paper tests the effect of local policy uncertainty on corpo- rate investment behavior. This paper indicates that local firms obviously re- duce investment expenditures owing to their expectation with regard to poli- cy uncertainty, especially in provincially controlled state-owned enterprises. Further study shows that local uncertainty affects the investors' pricing in capital market, which means the significant increase in the volatility rate of corporate returns. The empirical evidence proves the important role of local government policies in the allocation of economic resources, and the rise in the investment efficiency optimization of local listed companies benefiting from the decrease in local policy uncertainty.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第2期81-91,共11页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172141)
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(12JJD790033)
上海财经大学研究生科研创新基金项目(CXJJ-2011-381与CXJJ-2011-383)资助
关键词
地方官员变更
企业投资
政府干预
turnover of local officials
firm investment
government intervention