摘要
融合证券佣金的经济和社会功能,通过对投资者、券商和证监会三层次目标的讨论以及对目标导向型券商指导佣金率均衡模型的构建与分析发现:不存在使证监会综合目标最大的最优券商指导佣金率,只存在使证监会综合目标最小的最差券商指导佣金率;指导佣金率的优劣取决于其与最差券商指导佣金率的偏离程度,而不是其绝对值;证监会增加或是减少券商指导佣金率,需要建立在对既有指导佣金率及其增减幅度的科学把握上。
This paper merges the economic and social functions of commission rate for stock brokers with a discussion of investors,stock brokers and CSRC' goals as well as the construction and analysis of equilibrium model of target-oriented guiding brokerage commission rate.We find that there isn't any optimal guiding commission rate for stock brokers that can enable CSRC' target to the most but the worst one.The evaluation criteria of guiding commission rate does not depend on the absolute value but its deviation from the worst rate.Whether CSRC increase or decrease the guiding commission rate,it should be based on the deep understanding of current rate and the extent of it.
出处
《当代经济科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第1期63-66,126,共4页
Modern Economic Science
关键词
证券交易
佣金制度
佣金率
均衡模型
Securities Exchange
Commission System
Commission Rate
Equilibrium Model