供应链协调中的消费者策略行为与价格保障研究

Strategic Consumer Behavior and Price Guarantees in Supply Chain Coordination

考虑由一个制造商、一个零售商和若干具有策略行为的消费者组成的供应链。零售商在销售期开始前宣布实施价格保障承诺。销售期划分为全价期和清货期2个阶段,选择在全价期购买商品的消费者可以在清货期索要差价,策略型消费者要决定是否等到清货期购买商品。制造商和零售商之间实施批发价格和价格补贴的联合契约,对清货期剩余商品制造商会向零售商提供价格补贴。研究结果表明:消费者策略行为会降低供应链的利润,采用价格保障承诺可以缓解策略型消费者的等待行为,但不能完全消除等待行为;在策略型消费者存在的情况下,批发价和价格补贴联合契约可以在一定程度上增加零售商的利润,降低策略型消费者等待行为对零售商的不利影响。

A supply chain consisting of one manufacture, one seller, and a group of consumers with strategic behavior is considered in the paper. The retailer proclaims to implement price guarantee policy before selling. The selling season is divided into two periods, which are the regular period and the salvage period. If the consumer purchases in the regular period, he can claim the price difference in the salvage period. Strategic consumers must decide whether buy now or later. Combined contract of wholesale price and markdown money is implemented between the manufacturer and the retailer. The manufacturer offers the retailer compensation for the leftover after the selling reason. Results in- dicate that strategic consumer behavior reduces the profit of supply chain and price guarantees policy alleviate the strategic consumers＇ waiting behavior rather than eliminating it. In addition, with the existence of strategic consumers, combined contract of wholesale price and markdown money can part- ly increase the profit of retailer and lessen the adverse effect caused by strategic consumers＇ waiting behavior.