异质信念、融资决策与投资收益

Heterogeneous beliefs,corporate financing and investment return

放松现代公司融资理论的同质信念假设,在异质信念下构建公司股权债权融资模型,分析公司融资决策与投资者及管理者信念的关系,讨论异质信念下投资者和原股东的投资收益及公司过度投资.模型结论表明:投资者相对于管理者的信念越高,投资者间异质信念越大,则公司越倾向于发行股权融资;投资者相对于管理者的信念越高,投资者间异质信念越大,则股权融资的公司越可能发生过度投资,而债权融资公司的过度投资不受影响.以沪深A股2005-2010年再融资公司为样本,对模型结论进行实证检验,检验结果支持模型结论,并利用结论,从异质信念视角,解释我国上市公司股权融资偏好、过度投资等异象.

This paper considers a firm that may issue common stock or debt to undertake an investment oppor- tunity. Management and all investors are assumed to have differing beliefs of the returns from the investment. An equilibrium model of issue-investment decision is developed under the assumption. The model generates new predictions that the higher the investors＇ beliefs relative to the manager＇ s and the higher the heterogene- ous beliefs among investors, the more likely the firms will issue equity, and the more likely the firms that issue stock will overinvestment, but the overinvestment of the firms that issue debt will not be influenced. Using a sample of debt and seasoned equity issues between 2005 and 2010 from Chinese listed firms, we empirically analyze the above predictions. We find empirical results support the predictions. The model gives explanations for several aspects of Chinese corporate financing behaviors, including the puzzle of equity finance preference and overinvestment.