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互补型服务合作生产剩余控制权分配

Allocation of service complementary co-production residual rights
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摘要 知识密集型服务是客户与供应商合作生产的系统,双方信息黏性大小和正合作外部性强度影响合作剩余控制权的分配.基于相对重要性决定合作剩余控制权分配的研究基础,首先考虑了信息黏性对剩余控制权结构的影响,研究表明在既定的互补型服务合作生产关系中,信息黏性和相对重要性共同影响剩余控制权的分配.进一步分析了正合作外部性强度对剩余控制权结构的影响,研究表明足够强的正合作外部性会使信息黏性和相对重要性决定的合作剩余控制权结构发生转移.参与方的相对重要性、信息黏性大小、正合作外部性强度共同影响合作剩余控制权的分配. Knowledge-intensive business services are complementary co-production systems across client and provider organizations, and their information stickiness as well as the positive externalities will result in impact on the allocation of the residual rights. Based on the classic analytical frameworks of the relative importance affecting residual rights allocation, the model analyzes the impact of the information stickiness on the residual rights allocation and analytical results show that both the relative importance parameters and the information stickiness decide the best residual rights construction under the given complementary co-production positive externalities. Then, the impact of the positive externalities on the residual rights allocation is further discussed. It is shown that enough strong complementary degree will change the residual rights structure trade-offs underlying the relative importance parameters and the information stickiness. The model highlights that service complementary co-production residual rights allocation is jointly determined by the elasticity, the information stickiness and the positive externalities.
出处 《大连理工大学学报》 EI CAS CSCD 北大核心 2013年第1期138-144,共7页 Journal of Dalian University of Technology
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(重大项目70890080 70890083 71271039) 国家自然科学基金青年基金资助项目(70902033)
关键词 服务合作生产 信息黏性 正合作外部性 Nash讨价还价机制 剩余控制权 service co-production information stickiness positive externalities Nash bargainingsolution residual rights
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参考文献18

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