基于动态博弈的国企产权改革效率问题研究

Dynamic Game for the Efficiency of State-owned Enterprises Reform of Property Rights

在对已有文献回顾的基础上,利用讨价还价模型分析产权改革演变方向和过程。在此基础上利用斯塔克伯格博弈模型分析管理者与政府之间的博弈,并提出一系列理论命题,从理论上得出结论产权转移的有效性,以及现阶段的产权改革的合理性。最后提出了相应的政策建议。

Based on the existing literature review, through the bargaining model we analyze the evolution of property rights reform. Then, using Stackelberg model, we draw a conclusion that the transfer of property rights is theoretically ef- fective, and at this stage, the reform of property rights is reasonable. In the end, the paper concludes with appropriate policy recommendations.