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考虑公平关切的工期优化收益共享谈判 被引量:30

Revenue-sharing negotiation under time coordination based on fairness preference
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摘要 针对工程建设中工期优化问题,构建了立足于工程全生命周期角度的业主与承包商的收益共享谈判模型.设置了谈判双方均具有公平关切、仅业主具有公平关切、仅承包商具有公平关切三种实验情景,研究了主体公平关切程度对谈判可行域、谈判成功结果、谈判效率等方面的影响.实验结果表明:谈判双方的公平关切程度越高,谈判成功的可行域越小;主体适度提高公平关切程度,会导致工期优化幅度较大,但过度关注公平会导致双方成本大幅增长,不利于系统利润增长;主体不同的公平关切程度会对自身收益产生不同影响;双方保持适度公平关切能够提高谈判成功率,缩短谈判周期. Adopting a life-cycle perspective, this paper focuses on time compression in construction projects, and builds an agent-based model on revenue-sharing negotiation. We design three experimental scenarios: only owner has fairness preference, only contractor has fairness preference, both owner and contractor have fairness preferences. Our aim is to find how agents' fairness preferences impact feasible region of agreements, results of successful negotiations and efficiency in negotiations. Results are as fol- lows: raising agents' fairness preferences will compress the feasible region. When agents raise their fairness preferences properly, it will lead to a significant compression in construction time. However, when agents pay attention to fairness preferences excessively, it will lead to substantial cost growth and it is not con- ducive to growth of profit. Agents' different fairness preferences will take different effects on their profits. Appropriate fairness preferences of agents can improve the success rate of negotiations and shorten the negotiation periods.
出处 《系统工程理论与实践》 EI CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2013年第1期82-91,共10页 Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金 国家社会科学基金重大项目(11&ZD169) 国家科技支撑计划重点项目(2011BAG07B05) 国家自然科学基金重点项目(70831002) 国家自然科学基金(70971061 71001028 71001049 71101069 71171099)
关键词 工期优化 公平关切 收益共享契约 谈判模型 计算实验 ime coordination fairness preference revenue-sharing contract negotiation model compu-tational experiments
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