摘要
本文利用拍卖理论对土地挂牌和招标方式进行分析,证明竞标者向对手隐藏信息是造成挂牌中的竞价集中出现在现场竞价阶段的原因,而且与招标方式相比,挂牌方式因为能够向竞标者显示信息而形成了更高的土地价格;利用北京市土地出让数据证明挂牌方式既可作为调控市场的手段,又在信息显示作用下推高了地价,因此得到地方政府的青睐。地方政府的这一行为会削弱对房地产市场的调控效果,因此要避免挂牌方式的过度使用。
This article uses auction theory to analyze the Listing and procure methods of land use right transaction, and proves that the information hiding strategy of the bidder is the reason why bidding is gathered in the live phase. Listing price is higher than Procure- ment price because the former one has the advantage of information revelation. In empirical study, this article uses the transaction data to prove that Listing could not only be used as a measure of market control, but also bring higher prices, and hence is welcomed by local government. However, the effect of market control would be lessened because the behavior of local government, so the excessive use of Listing method should be avoided.
出处
《南开经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第4期97-112,共16页
Nankai Economic Studies
关键词
土地出让
挂牌
招标
拍卖理论
Land Use Right Transfer
Listing
Procurement
Auction Theory