经理管理防御对经理人薪酬及薪酬业绩敏感性影响分析——来自我国制造业上市公司的经验证据

An Empirical Analysis of Managerial Entrenchment Effect on the Manager's Compensation and Pay-performance Sensitivity: Evidence form listed Manufacturing Companies

为了分析经理管理防御对经理人薪酬及薪酬业绩敏感性的影响作用,先作影响机理分析,然后选取2008-2011年制造业上市公司为研究样本,通过构建经理管理防御指数,用实证研究方法得到如下主要结论:(1)在经理管理防御程度弱的企业,经理人薪酬与业绩相关。而在经理管理防御程度强的企业,经理人薪酬与业绩不相关;(2)对全样本分析发现经理防御程度的增强有助于经理人薪酬业绩敏感性的提高;(3)在同等条件下,随着经理管理防御程度的增强,非国有企业经理人薪酬业绩敏感性的变化程度明显大于国有企业。研究结果表明经理管理防御是影响经理人薪酬激励的重要因素,它可能使薪酬激励本身成为代理问题的一部分,对理解我国经理人薪酬激励的现状提供了新的视角和证据,为企业制定经理人薪酬时提供参考。

Basing on building managerial entrenchment index,the paper examines the managerial entrenchment＇s impact on the manager＇s compensation and pay-performance sensitivity by using the data of listed manufacturing companies form 2008 and 2011.The empirical results show that：（1）Under certain conditions,manager Compensation and performance are not related in the enterprise with a strong level of Managerial entrenchment,compared with enterprise with a weak level,indicating that Managerial entrenchment have a significantly influence on their own compensation;（2）Under certain conditions,there is a significant positive correlation between managerial entrenchment and manager＇s pay-performance sensitivity in the listed companies;（3） Under same conditions,with the strengthening of managerial entrenchment,the degree of change about managers-pay performance sensitivity in the non-state-owned enterprise is significantly greater than the state-owned enterprises.The results show that managerial entrenchment is an important factor affecting manager＇s Compensation Incentive,providing reference on making the managers＇ salary in enterprises.