基于信号博弈的土地使用权出让中围标“蜜罐”行为的分析

Honey Pot:Analysis on the Conspired Behavior in Bidding the Land Use Right Based on the Signal Game Theory

研究目的:依据土地使用权招标出让活动的特征,构建围标"蜜罐"行为的动态贝叶斯博弈模型,找出促使均衡结果合理化的因素变化差异和关系。研究方法:信号博弈。研究结果:(1)由分开均衡的求解可知,在土地使用权招标中,当招标人看到投标人报低价时将检查,看到投标人报高价时则不检查;投标人围标时将选择报低价,不围标时将报高价。(2)由合并均衡求解可知,无论投标人围标与否,投标人报低价时,此博弈有两个完美贝叶斯均衡。研究结论:为遏止投标人进行围标合谋这一"吃蜜罐"的行为,要增加围标成本、合理控制检查成本、降低投标人预期收益和完善惩罚形式、加大惩罚力度。

The purpose of this study is to construct the dynamic Bayesian game model to analyze the conspired bidding behavior,i.e.,the so-called honey pot seeking behavior,during the transfer of land use right and furthermore to find out the factors affecting the realization of the game equilibrium.The method of the signal game is employed.The results show that 1） during the solution of the separating equilibrium,when the tenderer offers a low price,the tenderee will inspect carefully;however,when the tenderer offers a high price,the tenderee will not inspect carefully.Therefore,under a honey pot seeking situation the tenderer will only offer a low price;2） no matter the tenderer makes a conspired bidding or not,there are two perfect Bayesian equilibriums for the game.Thus the paper concludes that it is necessary to increase the cost of the conspired behavior,control the inspection cost appropriately,reduce tenders＇ expected gains,ameliorate the form of punishment,and strength the punishment.