摘要
马克思关于"感性世界"的实践论诠释,对于我们理解马克思哲学的本体论内涵具有十分重要、十分独特的意义。而在马克思之前,康德和费希特分别对感性世界作出了各具特色的理论阐释。费希特从纯粹自我的纯粹活动出发,把感性世界理解为由"自我"设定的"非我"的世界,由此确认人的存在的二重性,并认为人的存在必然面遇世界的二重化,即作为经验世界的感性世界和作为道德秩序而存在的"超感性世界"。但他认为,人作为理性的能动的"自我"是可以把这两个世界结合起来的,即通过自我的实践活动,可以把作为超感性世界的道德秩序建构到感性世界中。马克思则从人的能动的感性活动出发,以人的存在和人的活动的对象性为依据,对费希特哲学作出了深刻的批判和改造,把感性世界理解为以人的感性活动为基础的世界。
Marx's interpretation of "sensible world" has very important and exclusive significance for us to understand the ontological connotation of Marxist philosophy. Kant and Fichte had made distinctive explanations of the sensible world respectively before Marx. Fichte regarded the sensible world as a "non-self" world set by "self". He confirmed the duality nature of human existence on the ground of the "pure activity" of "pure ego", and held that human existence would inevitably meet the dual world, i.e. the sensible world as an experiential world and the supersensible world as the moral order. But Fichte believed that man as a rational and dynamic "ego" could combine the two worlds. In other words, man could establish the moral order of the supersensible world within the sensible world. Marx criticized Fichte's philosophy and reformed on Fichte's theory. He regarded the sensible world as a world based on sensible activities of human beings. Marx's theory was grounded on the dynamic and sensible human activities with evidence from human existence and objects of human activities.
出处
《教学与研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第2期5-13,共9页
Teaching and Research