缺乏和包含不对称信息假设的信贷市场模型——兼论对中国金融改革的运用

Credit Market Model with the Assumption of the Asymmetric Information Model

本文比较了关于竞争性信贷市场的两个主要流派及其经典模型 ,即由McKinnon及Shaw开创的金融深化理论和Stiglitz及Weiss开创的信贷配给模型。前者假定信贷市场存在完全的信息和无风险 ,而后者假定信贷市场存在广泛的信息不对称和风险。本文指出 ,虽然不对称信息理论没有象金融深化理论那样向人们提供很明确的结论和很清晰的政策主张 ,但它为研究和解决我国金融改革中存在的种种问题提供了一个更切实际和更合理的分析框架。

This paper compares the two main strands of literature on the competitive credit market,the financial deepening theory that began with McKinnon(1973) and Shaw(1973),and the credit rationing models that started with Stiglitz and Weiss(1981).The former models assumed perfect information and absence of risk,while the latter took as the starting point risk of loan returns and asymmetric information between the bank and the borrowers.It is argued that while the former models provide clear\|cut conclusions and policy recommendations that the latter models lack,it is the asymmetric information models that provide a better framework within which to analyze issues of the Chinese financial sector reform.A final section provides briet comments regarding how to extend and make the asymmetric information models better amenable to application to issues of the Chinese financial sector reform.