摘要
筹资模式是基本养老保险制度的核心与关键。本文阐述了人口老龄化对中国养老保险的影响,提出中国化解人口结构老龄化时基本养老保险支付风险的主要策略取向,在于强化制度激励机制,同时兼顾一定的互济性。之后,从宏观经济的消费率和投资率关系、艾伦条件以及资本市场发育状况等方面,论述了中国还不具备足够的经济和社会发展条件,以将基本养老保险制度的筹资模式转向积累制(包括完全积累和部分积累)。最后,在对基本养老保险个人账户性质作充分讨论的基础上,研究了个人账户做实的必要性以及"空账"运行对个人权益的影响,并对今后我国基本养老保险统账结合模式的改革提出了相关建议。
The financing mode is the core of public pension system. This paper analyzes the effects of aging tendency of population for China' s pension system, and illuminates that the superimposed effect of different factors makes China' s pension population aging far faster than those developed countries with the distinctive characteristic of aging before wealthy. This tendency directly increases the maintenance burden of the incumbent. Therefore, it is necessary to expand coverage of public pension, in order to keep down the going-up dependency rate of the public pension system while preventing retirement pension from decreasing with a constant contribution rate. And the main strategic direction of decreasing payment risk under the circumstance of population aging is to strengthen the excita-tion mechanism of public pension and maintain pooling to some degree. Then, from the perspective of saving rate, Aaron Condition and capital market situation, this paper testifies why China should not transit its public pension from Pay-As-You-Go to funded system ( including fully and partially funded). Another difference between China and those countries choosing to give up the Pay-As-You-Go system is that the key limiting factor for China' s macro economy is not under-saving and underinvestment but under-con-sumption, and the main task is to expand consumption and optimize investment efficiency, which results in that it is not necessary, for a relative long time, to utilize the funded system to release the macro-economy effect of stimula-ting investment in China. In addition, the Aaron Condition will be met in China in the long term, that is, the growth of China' s population and economy would be able to support the PAYG system to some degree. Compared with those developed economies, China' s capital market is still located in the process of development with a huge volatility, and it is absolutely dangerous to permit public pension fund, related to numerous lower-middle-class fam- ilies, to make investment in such a market. This paper also rethink the nature of individual account in China' s public pension, the necessities to make in-dividual account funded and effects of notional account operation to individual equity. China' s public pension sys- tem adopts a pension mode combining social pooling with individual account, the individual account pension is linked directly with individual contribution, i. e. , the more employee contributes, the higher he will gets after re-tirement. That means the main purpose of introducing individual account is to set up an efficiency mechanism rather than to transfer the system to a partially funded one. The balance of China' s public pension fund is facing a serious pressure. The pension fund is hard to keep bal- ance without the subsidies from the government. Under this circumstance, funding the individual account will accu-mulate huge fund which leads to high administration cost and high investment risk, it is just like die with huge grain storage. Another challenge comes from fund investment. Currently, individual account funds in trial areas are man-aged by the social insurance institutions affiliated to human resource and social security administration, but these funds can be only deposited in the banks or appreciated through negotiated deposits. Therefore, the related institu-tion transform from an administrator to a fund manager. That will raise the investment risk and lead to rent-seeking behavior or moral hazard, which will finally cause damage to the security of individual account fund. Even in a country with highly developed capital market and perfected administration like USA, the OASDI trust fund is only kept quite small surpluses which are strictly limited its investment in special state bonds. As to China, since the so-cialist market economy is still on the way to perfection, huge individual account funds managed will harm the healthy development of capital market if the funds are invested in the stock market. necessary to fund the individual account. by the government Actually, it is not Since the governments take the ultimate responsibilities to pay pension benefits, even the individual account is notional, it is actually a long-term contingent liabilities guaranteed by government credits. Meanwhile, this long-term contingent liabilities is paid by installments during the beneficiaries' survival period, it is not a astronomical data paid in a lump just like estimated by some researches. If the government can pay the pension benefits as prom- ises, the individual account will not affect the individual pension equity whether it is notional or funded. Finally, the paper suggests reform the mode of pension system. First, China needs to set up a multi-pillar pen-sion system in order to reduce the burden of public pension system. Secondly, it is necessary to clarify and optimize the responsibilities between the government and individual, the responsibilities between the central and local gov- ernments. Thirdly, the actuary research should be strengthened. Fourthly, with scientific estimation, the govern-ment should make some arrangement to pay the implicit pension debts. Fifthly, the scope of pension fund invest-ment should be expanded in order to make the fund appreciated.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第2期96-104,共9页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )