摘要
由于目前特殊的市场条件及政府特意的制度安排 ,导致了中国国有商业银行存在着大量的效率损失 ,而同时各利益相关方又处于一种利益均衡状态。从而使改革陷入一种胶着状态。低效率的根源在于国家借银行信用实现对改革成本的时期转换和挂帐递延 ,而维持这一低效率均衡状态的现实机制是存款的持续高速增长。但外资银行的进入打破了这一基础 ,外部新变量的引入打破了原有的均衡 ,由此自然引发国有商业银行一系列的适应性调整 ,市场改革引致产权改革 ,产权改革又进一步促进市场调整。在这一调整过程中 ,绕过目前改革困境的一种可行的选择是“以国债换坏帐” 。
Because of special market condition and institutional arrangement by the government for particular intention nowadays,it is common to see a great deal of efficiency loss in the state\|owned commercial bank in China.But at the same time the interest\|relevant parties are caught in interest equilibrium,and reform in stagnation.The reason for low efficiency is that the government has achieved the maturity,conversion and deferment of reform cost by use of credit.To maintain this low efficiency equilibrium,the deposit must increase with high speed. Nevertheless,this basis will be weakened by the access of foreign banks to Chinese market.The introduction of new outer variable would destroy the former equilibrium,impelling the state\|owed commercial bank to adjust.That is ,the market reforms lead to property reform,and in turn the property reform accelerates the market adjustment.In the adjustment process,one practical choice to resolve these thorny problems arising from the great deal of bad assets is to transform the bad debt into bond and reconvert its own nature.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2000年第6期40-49,共10页
Journal of Financial Research
关键词
中国
国有商业银行
改革困境
外资银行
path\|dependent,low efficiency equilibrium,cost defer deposit support,market structure