摘要
稽察特派员制度是“政府主导型的强制性制度变迁” ,属于“帕累托较优改进” ,这种制度安排在一定程度上缓解了委托———代理问题。但这种制度安排的“行政性”而非“市场性”属性 ,以及事后监督而非全程监督等原因 ,决定了稽察特派员制度的过渡性。当稽察特派员制度的制度优势与所储能量释放到一定程度后 ,这种制度继续下去有可能影响国有企业改革的进程 ,这时稽察特派员制度向监事会制度的过渡是政府作出的理性选择。
The specially appointed supervisor system is a “government inducing forced institution transformation”, which is a kind of “pareto improvement”. To some degree, it alleviates some defects of agent problem. But the system's “non-market” quality and its afterwards supervision feature determine that it could only be transitional. When the advantages and the power of the system exhausts, it could effect SOEs' reforming process. At that time, a transition from the specially appointed supervisor system to corporation board of supervisors system is a rational choice.
出处
《经济学家》
CSSCI
北大核心
2000年第3期11-15,共5页
Economist
关键词
稽察特派员制度
过渡性
经济学分析
发展趋势
the specially appointed supervisor
institution arrangement
transitional
economic analysis